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The Nature and Consequences of the Plea of Nolo Contendere
The last session of the Nebraska legislature made available as a
part of the criminal procedure of the state the plea of nolo contendere,
or non vult. This was done by amending Section 29-1819 of the Ne-
braska Statutes to read as follows:
If the issue on the plea in bar be found against the defendant, or
if upon arraignment the accused offers no plea in bar, he shall plead
"guilty,". "not guilty," or "nolo contendere;" but if he pleads evasively
or stands mute, he shall be taken to have pleaded "not guilty."
The accused may, at any time before conviction, enter a plea of
nolo contendere with the consent of the court. The court may refuse to
accept the plea, and shall not accept the plea without first determining
that the plea is made voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of
the charge.'
The plea of nolo contendere originated in England, although it has
long since disappeared from the jurisprudence of that jurisdiction.2
The English judicial history of the plea seems to have been largely
derivative from a statement in Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown to the
following effect:
An implied confession is where a defendant in a case not capital
doth not directly own himself guilty, but in a manner admits it by
yielding to the King's mercy, and desiring to submit to a small fine: in
which case, if the court think fit to accept of such submission, and make
an entry that the defendant posuit se in gratiam regis, without putting
him to a direct confession, or plea (which in such cases seems to be left
to discretion), the defendant shall not be estopped to plead not guilty
in an action for the same fact, as he shall be where the entry is quod
cognovit indictamentum.3
Most other common law sources derive their description of the
consequences of the plea from this brief section of Hawkins' work.
The plea is now available in the United States in the Federal courts
4
and in at least 27 states5 (including Nebraska). Its existence has been
expressly denied in the courts of five states," albeit usually by dictum.
'L.B. 135, Neb. Legis., 65th Sess. (1953). The first paragraph is wordforword
the same as the old Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1819 (Reissue 1948), except that
"'guilty,' 'not guilty,' or 'nolo contendere'" replaces "'guilty' or not guilty.'"
The second paragraph is entirely new.
2 The last reported English use of the plea seems to have been in Regina v.
Templeman, 1 Salk. 55 (Q.B. 1702).
'2 Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 466 (8th ed. 1824).
' Fed. R. Crim. P. 12 (a).
"Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
Wyoming. See cases cited in Note, 152 A.L.R. 253 (1944), and supplemental
decisions thereto.
I Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Minnesota, and New York.
NOTES
In several respects evident in Hawkins' description the plea of nolo
should be compared with the plea of guilty. For one thing, Hawkins
limits the applicability of the plea to "cases not capital." The reason
for this unavailability in capital cases was stated by the Pennsylvania
court as follows:
The law is scrupulous to a degree in such cases to throw about the
accused every reasonable protection, and requires that before convic-
tion his guilt must be established by evidence which excludes all reason-
able doubt. An implied confession of guilt cannot give rise to the degree
of certainty which would make it the equivalent of an express con-
fession.7
The principle thus expressed has been universally accepted as a
characteristic of the plea. Some question might be raised as to whether
the Nebraska statute carries over this limitation; for the statute, with-
out reference to whether the case is capital or not, states: "[the de-
fendant] shall plead 'guilty,' 'not guilty,' or 'nolo contendere.'" It
might be argued that the failure to delimit capital from non-capital
cases makes the plea available in all cases arising subject to the
criminal procedure of the state, prescribed in the chapter of the
statutes of which this section is a part. This argument, however, seems
superficial, for of course the words "nolo contendere" in the statutes
would mean nothing to the lawyer were it not for the fact that a plea,
with certain characteristics, existed at common law bearing that name.
Insofar as the plea provided for in the statutes means anything beyond
what may spring to mind from a translation of the Latin phrase, that
meaning must be sought in the common-law characteristics which
have accreted to the plea. Among these characteristics was non-availa-
bility in capital cases. Its meaning in the statute should involve the
same consequence unless a clear contrary intention can be found. At
any rate, since both the statute and the common law make acceptance
of the plea discretionary with the court, the reasons stated by the
Pennsylvania court, quoted above, should motivate the court to
exercise its discretion soundly by denying the entry of the plea.
The next significant portion of Hawkins' description that is im-
portant to analysis of the plea is the statement that the defendant
makes the plea "desiring to submit to a small fine." A division of
opinion has arisen as to whether this quotation amounts to a limitation
on the availability of the plea, or simply expresses the hope or motiva-
tion of the defendant in entering it. Many early authorities seemed
to believe it to be the former, considering that upon a nolo plea the
court could not impose punishment more severe than a fine.8 This
Commonwealth v. Shrope, 264 Pa. 246, 107 Atl. 729 (1919).
8 2 Bishop, New Criminal Procedure § 802 (2d ed. 1913); Honaker v. Howe,
60 Va. 50 (1869); Tucker v. United States, 196 Fed. 260 (7th Cir. 1912).
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is still the view of some courts, which will not admit the plea for
offenses in which imprisonment is mandatory, and will limit punish-
ment to a fine if the plea is accepted to an offense for which fine and
imprisonment are alternative penalties.9 Another view will not al-
low the plea where imprisonment is mandatory, but where punish-
ments of fine and imprisonment are both possible the court is not by
its acceptance of the plea restrained from imposing the latter. 10 But
the Federal" and majority state view' 2 permits the court to accept the
plea and impose imprisonment in any case regardless of possible pun-
ishments prescribed, except of course in capital cases.
Another element apparent in Hawkins' discussion of the plea is the
discretion of the court in accepting or refusing its entry. There is no
dispute about this characteristic; the plea may not be entered as a
matter of right.13  The new Nebraska statute carries over this limita-
tion. And when the plea has once been properly accepted, its with-
drawal and the substitution of another plea is similarly in the court's
discretion. 4
When the plea has been properly accepted in a criminal case, its
incidents so far as that action is concerned are the same as on a plea
of guilty.1 The court may impose sentence on the plea without more,
judgment following plea as a matter of course as on a guilty plea. 16
It is beyond the province of the court once the plea is entered to make
any determination of the defendant's guilt. Evidence may be adduced
for the limited purpose of fixing the proper sentence, but not for a
determination of the facts as to guilt or innocence.'7  And the plea
must be accepted unqualifiedly if at all; it cannot be accepted subject
'Roach v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 954, 162 S.E. 50 (1927); Williams v.
State, 130 Miss. 827, 94 So. 882 (1923).
10 Schad v. McNinch, 103 W. Va. 44, 136 S.E. 865 (1927); Brozosky v. State,
197 Wis. 446, 222 N.W. 311 (1928).
11 Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926); Farnsworth v. Sanford,
33 F. Supp. 400 (N.D. Ga. 1940).
"Re Lanni, 47 R.I. 158, 131 Atl. 52 (1925); State v. Martin, 92 N.J.L. 436,
106 Atl. 385 (1919); Commonwealth v. Shrope, 264 Pa. 246, 107 Atl. 729 (1919);
Commonwealth v. Horton, 9 Pick. 206 (Mass. 1829). In several other cases im-
prisonment has been imposed for serious offenses in which the question of
limitation to fine was never raised. See, e.g., State v. Perkins, 129 Me. 477,
149 Atl. 148 (1930) (extortion).
"1 Caminetti v. Imperial Mutual Life Ins. Co., 59 Cal. App.2d 476, 139 P.2d
681 (1943); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366 (D.D.C. 1939);
State v. Suick, 103 W. Va. 44, 136 S.E. 865 (1927); Doughty v. De Amoreel, 22
R.I. 158,46 Atl. 838 (1900).
" United States v. Norris, 281 U.S. 619 (1930); Fox v. State, 112 Fla. 104,
150 So. 228 (1933).
"r Hudson v. United States, 272 U.S. 451 (1926).
"°Fischer v. Schilder, 131 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1942); State v. Suick, 195
Wis. 175, 217 N.W. 743 (1928).1" Crowley v. United States, 113 F.2d 334 (8th Cir. 1940); Commonwealth v.
Rousch, 113 Pa. Super. 182, 172 Atl. 484 (1934); State v. Osborne, 79 N.J. Eq. 430,
28 Atl. 424 (1912). But cf. Roitman v. United States, 41 F.2d 519 (7th Cir. 1930).
NOTES
to the right to consider and determine the facts.' By the nolo plea
a defendant waives all formal defects in the proceeding of which he
might have availed himself by a plea to the merits, a plea in abtement,
a demurrer or a motion to quash.19 He can, however, raise any in-
herent fatal defects apparent in the record, as that the indictment
charges no offense 20 or is seriously defective,21 or shows on its face
that the offense charged is barred by the statute of limitations. 22 The
court may also, of its own motion, strike the plea and dismiss in such
circumstances. 23
The element in Hawkins' description which forms the most use-
ful feature of the plea derives from the statement that "the defendant
shall not be estopped" to deny his guilt in a subsequent civil action
based on the same facts. The reference to "estoppel" is inaccurate so
far as the modern law of evidence is concerned: a more useful frame of
reference would be "admission" rather than "estoppel." The rule is
that a plea of guilty may be put into evidence in a subsequent civil
action as proof of the fact of guilt of the offense to which the plea
is responsive, on the theory that a plea of guilty is an admission
against interest.24 It is not actually an estoppel, and the fact of guilt
of which it is evidence may be refuted by the defendant;25 but it is
admissible for whatever probative value may be accorded it by the
trier of facts. A nolo plea, on the other hand, being an implied ad-
mission for the purposes of the criminal case only, is not admissible
as proof of the facts on which it was based in a subsequent civil action.26
For this reason, the plea is often utilized in criminal antitrust actions
by corporations which are willing to accept the criminal sanctions
rather than undergo the expenses of lengthy antitrust litigation, but
wish to avoid leaving themselves wide open to private civil treble
damage actions.
But the situation is different where it is the fact of conviction
rather than the fact of guilt that is relevant. For example, where a
8 Commonwealth v. Rousch, 113 Pa. Super. 182, 172 Atl. 484 (1934).
" State v. Alderman, 81 N.J.L. 549, 79 Atl. 283 (1911); State v. O'Brien, 18
R.I. 105, 25 Atl. 910 (1892).
"United States v. Kerper, 29 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1928), aff'd, 281 U.S. 619
(1930); Commonwealth v. Bienkowski, 137 Pa. Super. 474, 9 A.2d 169 (1939).
1 Commonwealth v. Grey, 2 Gray 501 (Mass. 1854).
12 United States v. Anthracite Brewing Co., 11 F. Supp. 1018 (D.D.C. 1934).
2" State v. Page, 112 Vt. 326, 24 A.2d 346 (1942).2' Wesnieski v. Vanek, 5 Neb. (Unof.) 512, 99 N.W. 258 (1904); 4 Wigmore,
Evidence § 1059 (3d ed. 1940).
"14 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 1059, 1066 (3d ed. 1940).
"White v. Creamer, 175 Mass. 567, 56 N.E. 832 (1900); People v. Edison,
100 Colo. 574, 69 P.2d 246 (1937) (subsequent disbarment proceeding); Fidelity-
Phenix Fire Ins. Co. v. Murphy, 231 Ala. 680, 166 So. 604 (1936); Teslovitch v.
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. of San Francisco, 110 Pa. Super, 245, 168 Atl. 354
'(1933); Collins v. Benson, 81 N.H. 10, 120 Atl. 724 (1923); State v. La Rose,
71 N.H. 435, 52 Atl. 943 (1902) (subsequent criminal action).
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multiple-offender statute makes a prior conviction the basis of in-
creased penalty upon a subsequent offense, or where a statute makes
conviction of a felony the basis for the denial or revocation of some
sort of license or dealership, or where a form given an individual to
complete requires him to state whether he has ever been convicted
of a crime, the judgment or sentence amounts to a conviction even
though it is entered on a nolo plea 27 It also, of course, amounts to a
prior conviction entitling the defendant to a plea in bar for double
jeopardy upon a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.28
A similar problem involves the use of the results of the criminal
proceeding in which the plea was entered in a subsequent civil action,
not as proof of the fact of guilt, but as evidence to impeach the
credibility of the former defendant if he takes the stand as a witness.
In this situation, as in those above-mentioned, it is primarily the fact
of conviction rather than the fact of guilt that is usable. It is the
record of the conviction of the crime, not the plea, that is introduced
to impeach.2 9 The witness' guilt of the offense is not retried as an issue
in the subsequent action, although some courts permit the witness to
explain the circumstances surrounding the crime to show that his
wrongdoing was not of such a serious character as the fact of his con-
viction, standing alone, would indicate.30 For this reason, the majority
of courts have held that a conviction for the purpose of impeaching
a witness results from judgment or sentence on a nolo plea, the same
as on any other.31 There is, however, some authority to the contrary,
holding the judgment inadmissible;32 and one questionable case has
said that proof of entry of the plea alone, without proof of judgment,
punishment or other further action taken pursuant to the plea, amounts
" Neibling v. Terry, 352 Mo. 396, 177 S.W.2d 502 (1944); People v. Daiboch,
265 N.Y. 125, 191 N.E. 859 (1934); State v. Suick, 195 Wis. 175, 217 N.W. 743
(1928).2 United States v. Glidden Co., 78 F.2d 639 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 296
U.S. 652 (1935).
2' 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 980 (3d ed. 1940).3 0Authorities are collected in Note, 166 A.L.R. 211 (1947).
M State v. Herlihy, 102 Me. 310, 66 Atl. 643 (1906); Berlin v. United States,
14 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1926); Pfotzer v. Aqua Systems Inc., 162 F.2d 779 (2d Cir.
1947); Commonwealth v. Sciullo, 169 Pa. Super. 318, 82 A.2d 695 (1951); Haley
v. Brady, 177 Wash.2d 775, 137 P.2d 505 (1943); State v. Radoff, 140 Wash. 202,
248 Pac. 405 (1926); State v. Vanasse, 42 R.I. 278, 107 Atl. 85 (1919).
- Olszewski v. Goldberg, 223 Mass. 27, 111 N.E. 404 (1916). State v. Conway,
20 R.I. 270, 38 Atl. 656 (1897), and Krowka v. Colt Patent Fire Arm Co., 125
Conn. 705, 8 A.2d 5 (1939), have been cited as authority for this proposition,
but it is submitted that they do not support it. The former case is based on
the absence of any clear proof that judgment of conviction had been entered
on the plea, and the latter is based on a characterization of the offense involved
in the previous crime as not involving moral turpitude.
NOTES
to a conviction.33 Another case from the same jurisdiction has also
reached a doubtful result, in the situation where the witness being im-
peached is also a party in the subsequent action. This case held, in
accord with the general view, that judgment rendered on the plea is a
conviction admissible for impeachment, but said further that the im-
peaching effect is twofold: (1) It discredits the witness generally, in
that one convicted of a crime would be likely to lie, and (2) It discredits
his denial of wrongdoing in the present action by showing that he has
previously made a statement inconsistent with the position he now
asserts.34  It is submitted that the second effect mentioned is in-
harmonious with the nature of the nolo plea, for by pleading nolo con-
tendere in the first action the defendant has made no statement at
all of what the facts actually are; he has merely expressed disinclina-
tion to contest the charge with the state, and suffered punishment to
be levied against him.35 It is for this reason that the plea is uni-
versally held not to be usable as an admission in a subsequent action,
and the same reason should prevent an interpretation of the plea of
nolo contendere as making a statement or admission inconsistent with
any that the witness may now assert, when impeachment is attempted.
Whether the plea of nolo contendere serves any useful function in a
system of state criminal procedure is a debatable question. Several
states have eliminated the plea from their practice,30 and the court
of another state in which the plea is used has questioned its desirability
in modern practice.37 The American Law Institute's Code of Criminal
Procedure expressly abolishes all pleas other than guilty or not guilty,38
and England, in which the plea had its origin and early development,
has long since dispensed with its use. On the other hand, the non-
admissibility of the plea in collateral civil proceedings may often be
a characteristic which will induce a defendant, who would otherwise
plead not guilty and undergo a trial rather than provide an admission
usable by his expected adversary in a subsequent civil action, to save
both his time and that of the prosecuting authorities by entering a nolo
plea. The example which comes most readily to mind would involve
a motorist who has been cited for violation of traffic laws relating to
an automobile accident concerning which he (or his insurer) anti-
cipates litigation. The defendant would be unwilling to plead guilty
because such a plea would be admissible and amount to strong evidence
11 State v. Henson, 66 N.J.L. 601, 50 AtL 468, 616 (1901). Contra: Collins v.
Benson, 81 N.H. 10, 120 Atl. 724 (1923); State v. Conway, 20 R.I. 270, 38 Atl.
656 (1897).
'
4 Johnson v. Johnson, 78 N.J. Eq. 507, 80 Atl. 119 (1911).
"See cases cited supra note 26.
'o Supra note 6.
- 7 Commonwealth v. Shrope, 264 Pa. 246, 107 Atl. 729 (1919).
18 A.L.I Code of Criminal Procedure § 209 (1930).

